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A CRITICISM OF CRITICISM: IN RE MEANING
RAY D. HENSON*
Philosophers and literary critics have long discussed the meaning of words-
or, more exactly, whether words thernselves have any real icaning. Thc
argument, Mr. Henson suggests, is relevant also to legal criticism. "Words
about words may generate and perpetuate argunicnts, but they do not solve





-ELoT, The Hollow Men.
OOK reviews are sometimes more provocative than the books re-
viewed. A highly interesting problem was touched on recently in
these pages by a very distinguished lawyer, Mr. James Al. Landis, re-
viewing a book which he felt, for a variety of reasons, was misnamed.1
Specifically, he thought the word "landmarks" was singularly inappropri-
ate to describe a collection of essays, or at least this collection of legal
essays. The "true" landmarks of the law "are generally to be found in
the decisions of our courts .... " Is this so? How do we determine the
"true" usage of words?3 How do we determine the meaning of words?
And what does this have to do with law?
* Member of the Illinois and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1. Landis, Book Review, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 201 (1960). The booh reviewcd was
Landmarks of Law (1960), edited by the author of this article.
2. Ibid. Mr. Landis concluded his review by discussing other collections of legal artice
published during the past three decades, and he said, "But neither their authors nor editors
have suggested that the articles so chosen were landmarks of the law. Rather, their belief
seems to have been that these essays were cairns, some moss-covered, some newly built,
which could lead judges through the fog of litigation to a decision which might in time
deserve iteration and reiteration as a landmark of the law." Id. at 202. This usage of
"cairn" would seem to be an imaginative one. The word is defined in Webzds New Inter-
national Dictionary (2d ed. 1957) as a rounded or conical heap of stones, specifically "one
heaped up as a landmark."
3. Wittgenstein states this case: "Given the two ideas 'fat' and qean,' would you be
rather inclined to say that Wednesday was fat and Tuesday lean, or the other way round?
(I incline to choose the former.) Now have 'fat' and 'lean' some different mcaning here
from their usual one?-They have a different use.-So ought I really to have uscd dif-
ferent words? Certainly not that.-I want to use these words (with their familiar meanings)
here." Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 216e (1953). A comparable situation with
the word "philatelic" occurs in Landis, supra note 1, at 201, when he refers to "Mr. Justice
Cardozo, who gave to private law a majesty far beyond the philatelic collection of au-
thorities... ." If we wanted only the accepted standard usage of words, we might consult
Evans, A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage (1957), or if we wanted the ex-
tremely proper usage, we might consult Fowler, Modern English Usage (1937), but neither
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Words in themselves "mean" nothing. This point is not grasped, of
course, by primitive peoples who fancy a connection between a name and
a person as something real, so that magic can as easily be performed
through the use of a name as through physical contact. 4 Although we are
more sophisticated in such matters, we still use such expressions as "In
the name of the Law," and we apparently attach a magical significance
to oaths.5
It has perhaps become trite to quote Humpty Dumpty's observation:
"When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less." 6 But this is usually quoted as an example of something
ridiculous, not as a statement which is true in fact.
There is no completely satisfactory theory of meaning, but there are
a number of theories which offer some valuable insights into the
problem. In passing, the Platonic theory of ideas is worth noting.7 The
logical part of the theory deals with the meaning of general words,
distinguishing between particular objects and their general names. What
do we mean by "dog"? Something different from any particular animal,
something eternal, existing whether Fido is dead or alive. On the
metaphysical side, "dog" means an ideal, heavenly dog. The animals we
see are imperfect copies; they are only apparent; the heavenly dog
is real.
St. Augustine thought of language as a naming process.' This is, quite
likely, how children learn language: they hear their parents name an
object and come to associate the name and the thing. The words may
be general or specific: "man" or "Daddy," for example. This view of
language perhaps gave rise to the idea that all words have meanings. But
in the sense of naming, all words do not have meanings. Many words do
not name any thing at all. It is generally assumed that the more intellec-
tual the discourse, the fewer the names that are used. Some years ago
Bertrand Russell worked out a theory of "object words" which bears
some resemblance to St. Augustine's views, although Russell's ideas are
considerably more subtle.
One of the most famous theories of meaning was set forth by C. K.
of these books is or could be a guide to the imaginative, effective, and affective use of
English.
4. Frazer, The Golden Bough 284-92 (1951).
5. Silving, The Oath (pts. 1-2), 68 Yale L.J. 1329, 1527 (1959).
6. Carroll, Complete Works 214 (Modern Library ed. 1936).
7. See Russell, A History of Western Philosophy 119-32 (1945).
8. Augustine, Confessions 11 (Modern Library ed. 1949).
9. See Russell, Words and Meaning, in Selected Papers 347 (1927); Russell, Human
Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits 57-158 (1948); and Russell, My Philosophical Develop-
ment 145-55 (1959).
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Ogden and I. A. Richards in The Meaning of Meaning, first published in
1923. They used the term "symbol" in a restricted sense for words which
referred to things or events or happenings, and so forth.'0 Other words
were called "emotive." In their triangle of reference, at one base there
was a symbol (say, the word "chair"), at the apex there was the thought or
reference (the mental conception), and at the other base there was the
referent (the actual chair referred to)." The relationship between the
symbol and the referent was imputed, not real. The word "law" could
not be a symbol in this terminology, except perhaps when used to refer
to a particular statute. Words like "right" and "duty" have no referents.
As 1Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out many years ago12 and as Professor
Alf Ross has shown recently,13 those words are semantically void, they
can refer to nothing, and they are merely shorthand expressions which
act as bridges between sets of facts and their predicted legal con-
sequences.
Professor Quine seems to feel that the theories of Ogden and Richards
are too simple.' 4 He does not admit the existence of meanings. He feels
that people talk of meanings in two ways: the having of meanings
("significance") and the sameness of meaning ("synonomy" 1).1 It is not
necessary to use "meaning" at all. But while practically all words have
several or even many "definitions" and they can be used in significant
sequence so far as a speaker or listener may be concerned, the fact is
that in discourse of any consequence absolute identity of understanding
between two people is probably impossible. There is a great deal of
10. The word is not necessarily so restricted in its usage by others. See, e g., Sapir,
Language 127-56 (1921). In Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (1946), the glozmry
defines symbol as "a sign that is produced by its interpreter and that acts as a subtitute
for some other sign with which it is synonymous; all signs not symbols are dignals. Symbols
may be pre-language, language, and post-language symbols." Sign is defined as "Roughly:
something that directs behavior with respect to something that is not at the moment a
stimulus. More accurately: If A is a preparatory-stimulus that, in the absence of stimulus-
objects initiating response-sequences of a certain behavior-family, causes in some organism
a disposition to respond by response-sequences of this behavior-family, then A i a sign.
Anything that meets these conditions is a sign; it is left undecided whether there are signs
that do not meet these conditions."
11. Ogden & Richards, The Meaning of Meaning 11 (6th ed. 1943).
12. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167, 174-75 (1920). As
Mr. Justice Holmes told us in 1S99, long before Ogden and Richards, "We mUEt think
things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for
which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true." Holmes, Law in Science and
Science in Law, in Collected Legal Papers 210, 238 (1920).
13. Ross, Tfi-TO, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812 (1957).
14. Such seems to be a reasonable interpretation of Quine, From a Logical Point of
View 48 (1953).
15. Id. at 47-64.
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difference in result between saying, "Bring me that book," while pointing
to a specific object, and saying, "Tell me what 'due process' means."' 0
Wittgenstein pointed out that "philosophy is a battle against the be-
witchment of our intelligence by means of language."' 7 (He was un-
doubtedly referring to his own particular philosophy.) He seemed to
feel that an explanation of language in terms of naming objects was
primitive, that the explanation of language lay in usage. We play lan-
guage-games. "When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going
through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is
itself the vehicle of thought." 8
In general, "meaning," if there is any, is probably determined largely
by context. "Bookmaking" when used in connection with horse races
is quite different from "bookmaking" at Harper and Brothers. But
words in a sentence may be combined in good grammatical order and the
most significant words may have referents, and still the sentence may
make no "sense." It is pointless to argue over questions-or collections
of words followed by question marks-like, "Which school is better,
Oxford or Cambridge?" "Does the decision in the School Segregation
Cases agree with Natural Law?" "Was Taney a greater Chief Justice
than Hughes?" These questions are non-sense.' They are unanswerable.
They are, however, not much more absurd than the quodlibets currently
circulated by some of the Supreme Court's critics.2"
16. If we would admit that "due process" could "mean" anything at all, we would
surely recognize, for example, that what was due process in 1901 is not due process in
1961. The term cannot be defined satisfactorily in the abstract; it can only be meaningfully
used with reference to adjudicated cases where, on the given facts, the standard of due
process was said to be met or not to be met. On the general problem of abstractions see
Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (1949); Korzybski, Science and Sanity 371-8S
passim (4th ed. 1958); Weinberg, Levels of Knowing and Existence 48-76 passim (1959).
With particular reference to legal problems, see Cairns, Language of Jurisprudence, In
Language: An Enquiry Into its Meaning and Function 232 (Anshen ed. 1957); Ross, On
Law and Justice 111-23 passim (1959) ; Voegelin, Yegerlehner & Robinette, Shawnee Laws:
Perceptual Statements for the Language and for the Content, in Language in Culture 32
(Hoijer ed. 1954); Probert, Law, Logic, and Communication, 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 129 (1958).
17. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 47e (1953).
18. Id. at 107e.
19. On the problem generally, see Johnson, People in Quandaries 289-91 passim (1946);
Weinberg, Levels of Knowing and Existence 212-54 (1959).
20. "The antagonism between mumpsimus and sumpsimus is the linguistic counterpart
of the deep division to be found in all areas of life and in all disciplines. It appears in
ethics as hedonism versus asceticism, in politics as the freedom of the individual versus the
authority of the State, in jurisprudence as natural law versus positive law, in literature as
the validity of the soul's inner experience versus the chastening influences of social discipline.
The ultimate question in this eternal struggle is who is to be the master, who is to sit in
the saddle and who is to crack the whip-man or law, deed or logos, life or language,
experience or expression, the rebellious priest or society?" Jacobs, Naming-Day in Eden
140 (1958).
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When we discuss problems in language which cannot refer to any
thing, inherent ambiguity should be recognized. A great many legal
problems are insoluble on a theoretical level. True, we must have theory,
but it must have a basis in practice if it is to be worthy of serious
consideration. Words about words may generate and perpetuate argu-
ments, but they do not solve problems involving people and things.
There are no absolutes in law, nor in any other intellectual discipline
where the mode of language expression has a structure that corresponds
with actuality.
Controversy over fixed meanings or the "original" meanings of vague
constitutional provisions is a rather sterile pastime. In connection with
a due process question, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pointed out that
Words being symbols do not speak vithout a gloss. On the one hand the gloss may
be the deposit of history, whereby a term gains technical content. Thus the require-
ments of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments for trial by jury in the federal courts
have a rigid meaning. No changes or chances can alter the content of the verbal
symbol of "jury"--a body of twelve men who must reach a unanimous conclusion if
the verdict is to go against the defendant. On the other hand, the gloss of some of the
verbal symbols of the Constitution does not give them a fixed technical content. It
exacts a continuing process of application.
To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing "due
process of law" at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the
most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate
machines and not for judges.. . . Even cybernetics has not yet made that haughty
claim. To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no
doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude
that one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance to.ard views not shared.
But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely
the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with ultimate judicial
power. 1
Critics can argue over the actual exercise of judicial power in
particular cases, but to be meaningful the criticism must be specific and
not couched in emotive generalities.
As is well-recognized, probably unconsciously by many lawyers, we
can often condition another's response to our arguments by the use of
carefully chosen words. 2 But a primarily emotional response is nonethe-
less a response, and emotion and intellect are no more separable than
heredity and environment.
When Professor Hart wrote his widely publicized article, "The Time
Chart of the Justices,"' 3 he undermined his possibly valid criticisms of the
21. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952).
22. See, Stevenson, Ethics and Language 139-51 (Yale Pap~rhound ed. 1960); Prohert,
Law and Persuasion: The Language-Behavior of Lawyers, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1959).
23. 73 Hlarv. L. Rev. S4 (1959).
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Court by semantically empty, irritatingly pontifical expressions culminat-
ing in this way: "But the time must come when it is understood again,
inside the profession as well as outside, that reason is the life of the
law and not just votes for your side. When that time comes, and the
country gathers its resources for the realization of this life principle, the
principle will be more completely realized than it now seems to be."
2 4
What on earth does this mean? Or to take another example: "Only
opinions which are grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent
can do the job which the Supreme Court of the United States has to
do."25 It is fairly clear, in the context of the article, that "reason" is
something the writer agrees with, and that is all it "means." And there
has never been a judicial decision in the history of the world that was
grounded on "mere fiat" or precedent alone; thinking processes do not
work that way. We are products of the totality of our experiences, and
our reactions to current problems must be conditioned, negatively or
positively, in one degree or another, by what we have cumulatively
experienced. To think otherwise is to imagine an ideal which does not
conform to reality.
Of course, Judge Arnold demolished Professor Hart's article rather
completely.2" The author of The Symbols of Government (1935) and
The Folklore of Capitalism (1937) can see through empty words."
Dean Griswold has now compared the articles of Hart and Arnold,28 and
apparently he feels that Hart came out ahead. Professor Hart referred
to "the maturing of collective thought," '29 and Judge Arnold said, "There
is no such process as this, and there never has been. . .,3 Dean Gris-
wold thinks Judge Arnold failed on this point.31 The Judge won.
There is no such thing as "the maturing of collective thought." It is
difficult to imagine how the Dean could find it a "profound reality,""2
and his only examples are instances where he was persuaded to change
his mind after talking with others. Change is not necessarily maturation.
In any event, the concept, if such it be, is too vague to spend much dis-
cussion on. It is perhaps accurate to say that every noun is an abstrac-
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id. at 99.
26. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 (1960).
27. Another brilliant lawyer who never lets words obscure what is really happening Is
A. A. Berle, Jr. See, e.g., Berle, Power Without Property (1959).
28. Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 81 (1960).
29. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 100 (1959).
30. Arnold, supra note 26, at 1312.
31. Griswold, supra note 28, at 85.
32. Ibid.
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don in one degree or another, but some abstractions are too "abstract"
for profitable thought.
Too much of the recent criticism of the Supreme Court is of this
semantically empty variety. It is of no value to anyone. It is all too true
that Thomas Reed Powell's critic's chair has not been filled.'
What does it "mean" to say that the Supreme Court's decisions are
"sometimes more 'result oriented' than is ideal"?"1 What is "ideal"?
How could a judge possibly decide a case without considering the result
of his decision?"5 Judges are not passionless automatons, and an applica-
tion of law to facts (or "evidence" as Justice Loevinger properly calls
it"0 ) is never an automatic process.37 "Law" can be viewed from many
angles, but it is a part of life and it cannot exist independently. It would
seem to me pointless to look at legal principles as Platonic universals or
anything of the sort. They are simply mental conceptions which cannot
-satisfactorily-be analyzed too closely. In a practical address Mr.
Justice Holmes once said, "When we study law we are not studying a
mystery.. ,,"'I but on a philosophical level law is a mystery. That is
why eminent scholars, brilliant lawyers, and able judges can get lost in
a "bog of logomachiy," in the phrase of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.' Com-
munication fails because the words so often refer to nothing, and we
cannot reach agreement on "meaning."
We talk about "neutral principles of constitutional law,"" but principles
cannot be neutral.
33. An observation by Dean Griswold. Griswold, supra note 23, at 81-82.
34. Id. at 91. Professor Powell said, "If a precedent involving a black hobrs is applied
to a case involving a white horse, we are not excited. If it were an elephant or an animal
ferae naturae or a chose in action, then we would venture into thought. The diffcrence
might make a difference. We really are concerned about precedents chiefly when their facts
differ somewhat from the facts in the case at bar. Then there is a gulf or hiatus that has
to be bridged by a concern for principle and a concern for practical results and practical
wisdom." Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation 36 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (involving the redefining of
the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, to exclude Negro voters). See also Lewis, Legslative
Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1953).
36. Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. Res. L. Rev. 154 (1958).
37. As judge Learned Hand has pointed out, "All ruls of law necese arily terminate in
facts which contain no shred of law." Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart
of the Matter, in Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Lceturcs on Legal Topics
1921-1922, 89 at 91 (1926). See generally Frank, Courts on Trial (1950).
38. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167 (1920).
39. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 343 (1953).
40. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1959). But see Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Dcions,
69 Yale LJ. 421 (1960).
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Adherence to neutral principles, in the sense of principles which do not refer to
value choices, is impossible in the constitutional adjudicative process .... [N]eutrality
of principle, as distinguished from neutrality of attitude, is an obviously fallacious
way of characterizing the situation. Principles, whatever they might be, are abstrac-
tions, and it is the worst sort of anthropomorphism to attribute human characteristics
to them. Neutrality, if it means anything, can only refer to the thought processes of
identifiable human beings. Principles cannot be neutral or biased or prejudiced or
impersonal-obviously. 41
Wittgenstein puts this problem:
Compare knowing and saying:
how many feet high Mont Blanc is-
how the word "game" is used-
how a clarinet sounds.
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, you are
perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.
42
Many of our criticisms of the Supreme Court are as difficult to put
into meaningful words as a description of how a clarinet sounds. Perhaps
that is because certain decisions do not appeal to our innate feelings,
rather than because they offend our reasoned, "neutral principles."
It is time that someone, no matter how insignificant, voted to affirm
the Court's decisions. I take my stand on the side of the Court. Over
the course of a term, the Court's decisions make more "sense" to me
than most of the criticisms. I would rather have our nine Justices with
their varied, human, impassioned approaches to problem-solving than
any nine critics of the Court that anyone could name.
41. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 661, 664 (1960). This article is replete with citations from eminent scholars
in many fields (such as Bridgman, Polanyi, Myrdal, Berlin, Niebuhr) to the effect that
neutrality or objectivity is not attainable in the social sciences or in the natural sciences.
Bridgman is quoted as saying: "I will not attach as much importance as do apparently a
good many professional lawyers to getting all law formulated into a verbally consistent
edifice. No one who has been through the experience of modern physics . . . can believe that
there can be such an edifice. . . ." Id. at 666 n.20.
42. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 36e (1953).
